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Abstract
We introduce a theory of return-seeking firms to study the differences
between this and standard profit-maximising models. In a competitive
market return-maximising firms minimise average total costs leading to
output choices independent of price movements. We investigate the poten-
tial for mark-ups over cost under both competitive and non-competitive
market structures and characterise output and input choices under both,
amongst a series of other interesting results. We also extend the model in
the case of discrete output and input space and show what conditions are
required of demand shifts for firms to modify their production plan.
1 Objectives and behaviour of firms
Standard models of firm behaviour in economics assume firms maximise profits,
taken to be sales revenue minus production costs, when choosing their com-
binations of inputs and outputs. However, in the financial management and
business literature it is taken as somewhat axiomatic that the decisions of the
firm are characterised by maximisation of the risk-adjusted rate of return on
costs, empirically1, and theoretically2. A similar, and venerable, body of re-
search in empirical economics supports the theory that firms seek to maximise
returns, finding that firms typically assess capital investments and decisions in
general through internal rate of return or net present value criteria (Kuh, 1963;
Jorgenson and Stephenson, 1967; Blinder, Canetti and Lebow, 1998).
In a world of constraints on behaviour it is perfectly logical for firms to seek
returns in their production activities rather than profits in the first instance.
When a firm is constrained in the amount of resources it can invest, the op-
timal behaviour is to choose that production plan which returns the greatest
amount on the costs incurred in pursuing a revenue stream. This is the stan-
dard axiom of the literature on “capital budgeting” which analyses investment
decisions where constraints on financial capital availability are present, stating
that that investment which returns the greatest for the amount invested should
be selected.
∗University of Queensland, contact email: ckmurray@gmail.com.
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1Graham and Harvey (2001) find that 75% of firms surveyed used net present value, or,
somewhat equivalently, internal rate of return decision rules
2See any major text on financial management such as Berk and DeMarzo (2013, pp.207-
214)
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Moreover, the logic of return maximising firms is supported by the real
options literature, centered around Dixit and Pindyck (1994) in which firms
have the ability to delay incurring irreversible costs of production, and thus
face the problem of selecting the optimal point at which exercise their option
to invest. The opportunity cost of not exercising the real option to invest
in a production plan is the rate of return on that production plan (Pindyck,
1991, pp.1119-1120). The value of the option is then directly and monotically
dependent on the rate of return (Pindyck, 1991, p.1123), and if the value of the
firm is reflected in the value of its real option to invest and produce, the value
of the firm also depends directly on the rate of return. Hence it follows that,
were the option to be exercised and the firm to engage in production, the logic
of optimality implies it would choose that production plan which maximised its
returns, and hence the opportunity cost of not investing, and hence the value
of the real option.
We seek here to analyse, using standard and mathematically rigorous meth-
ods what implications this assumption on the objective function, rather than
profit maximisation has in the economic sense for the supply of output. In short,
we seek here to build a theory concerning the choices of return-seeking firms.
We know of no such theory prior to the present work that incorporates standard
investment analysis into a model of the firm within a market context.
Although the conceptual difference between profit and rate of return seems
and is really rather minor3, we show that changing this key element in fact
radically alters the theory of firm behaviour in a number of ways. In the first
instance, a firm within a competitive market (i.e. one where the firm is a price
taker) no longer seeks to equate marginal costs with the price prevailing, but
rather to minimise costs alone, which implies that the concept of a supply curve,
a response of supply to prices, breaks down. In such markets the supply “curve”
of each firm is vertical at the cost minimising level of output. Rather strong
additional assumptions on demand are required to eliminate the possibility of
non-trivial mark-ups over marginal cost, even in competitive markets. Interest-
ingly, this also requires us to incorporate in a significant way economies of scale
in production to allow for decreasing costs over some region of output space,
which is necessary for a non-trivial minimum output to exist.
In general, without imposing the assumption of perfect competition on our
model there remains some general agreement of our theory of firm behaviour
with standard models insofar as non-competitive markets are concerned, as
output under non-perfect competition will be restricted relative to perfectly
competitive output. In this model we can clearly observe how the degree of
competitiveness in the market affects the decision making process of the firm,
and it is quite transparent that as the market becomes more competitive and as
the firm increasingly loses control of the price it sets, it shifts its attention with
increasing exclusivity toward minimising costs. However, in this model, we can-
not without additional knowledge, or assumptions about the exact specification
of the demand and cost curves analyse the response of firm choices to changes in
demand under non-competitive markets. Hence, the direction, in general, of the
relationship between demand, output choice and price cannot be determined.
Indeed, we demonstrate informally that it is entirely possible for an increase in
3Profit pi (q) being the revenue minus costs, and rate of return here taken to be the revenue
minus costs divided by costs, or profit divided by costs
pi(q)
c(q)
2
demand to lead to a decrease in the price of output. Fascinating though, is the
implication of this model that, insofar as non-competitive firms will respond to
demand while firms in competitive markets will not, perfect competition can be,
in some sense, less efficient than imperfect competition.
In this paper we also introduce concepts in our model of return-seeking firms
to make tractable the discrete rather than continuous nature of many economic
processes, which have been demonstrated to be of importance in a range of
different economic contexts by Levine and Pesendorfer (1995). Many economic
processes are “quantum” for physical or institutional reasons, requiring the in-
volvement of some minimal unit, such that dynamics are discrete rather than
continuous. In particular, our model “quantises” (or, makes discrete) both the
output and capital input spaces, reflecting the fact that some minimal unit of
output is required for consumption and similarly some minimal unit of capital
is required before it is productive. This has significant implications under non-
competitive markets for the responses of firms to changes of demand. Because
of this quantised nature of inputs and outputs, markets do not clear in the tra-
ditional sense, and as such, the welfare theorems do not hold in an unaltered
form. Demand is not necessarily met fully (under-supply), or firms may have
to oversupply simply because of the minimal unit required for output, even in
price-taking markets with utterly free entry. Nor are profits necessarily always
maximised. In this sense we can say the theory is one of return-seeking, rather
than maximising firms. Moreover the capital debates (see Samuelson (1966))
made clear that the lumpiness of capital is an important consideration in firm
production, and the current model based on a theory of return-seeking firms
makes it possible to explicitly address this point, showing that quantum shifts
in output decisions are required for increases in the use of capital inputs.
We proceed as follows. In Section 2 we work first through the implications
for output of a theory in which firms maximise returns, deriving a fundamental,
single equation, maximising condition on output which allows us to analyse
both competitive and non-competitive markets. Continuing with our model, in
Section 3 we introduce a quantised output space and analyse the dynamics of
firm supply in response to changes in demand, before introducing in Section 4 a
standard cost-minimisation theory of input choices, but where capital inputs are
quantised in a similar manner to output for a number of physical or institutional
reasons. In Section 5 we discuss further some implications of our model in
an informal manner, before concluding the exposition of our theory of return-
seeking firms.
2 Production plan of a return maximising firm
We can express returns on costs from the present up to an horizon T ∈ R
over continuous time by means of the expression R (q) for returns on costs as a
function of output q = {qt}Tt=0 ⊂ Q ⊂ R+
R (q) =
∫ T
0
e−ρt
[
p (qt) qt − c (qt)
c (qt)
]
dt (1)
Here, p (qt) : Q → P is a mapping from the firm’s output to the price
p ∈ P ⊂ R++ of that output, and can thus be thought of as the demand
curve for the firm. This specification is convenient in allowing us to switch
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easily between perfect competition and a variety of non-competitive market
structures including monopoly and oligopoly. To do so, we simply alter the
form of the function to include the variables of interest as parameters from the
point of view of the firm4, most importantly, the output of substitute products
by competitors. The cost function c (qt) : Q → C maps the firm’s output into
its costs c ∈ C ⊂ R+ of producing that output. Both mappings are taken to
be independent of time across the life of the planning problem. The term ρ
is a discount rate. In a similar fashion we can define a production function
q : X → Q from a space of inputs X ⊂ R|X|+ into the output space Q ⊂ R+,
independent of time also and implicit in 1 so that q = q (x).
We take the returns maximised by firms to be the returns on cost because this
takes account of the fact that the cost c (qt) is the cost which is required to obtain
the profits p (qt) qt − c (qt) from production qt, thus reflecting the total value
of all the resources which must be dedicated toward earning that profit. R (q)
then reflects the return on the resources committed to production, incorporating
the costs of obtaining capital within wider costs incurred. Indeed, if finance is
required to pay these costs in the first place (as is the case when costs occur
before revenues are realised) then this expression is return on all investments.
Hence, maximising this function maximises the value of the firm in a quite broad
sense, when the firm is valued according to its return on investment.
Indeed, we can show that maximising returns thus defined maximises the
rate of change of profit per resource input (i.e. cost) and hence maximises the
rate of change of firm value in costs incurred5.
Our theory of firms then states that the planned sequence q = {q∗t }Tt=0 ⊂ Q
of outputs that the firm selects will maximise returns, or, formally that the
vector {q∗t }Tt=0 satisfies the condition
{q∗t }Tt=0 = argmax{qt}Tt=0⊂QR (q) (2)
which, assuming that R (qt) is a continuous and differentiable mapping in Q
requires that
∂
∂qt
R (q) = 0 ∀ t ∈ [0, T ] (3)
Now, it has been hitherto implicitly assumed in the expression of demand
and costs at time t that they depend on output at t, qt alone
6. If this is indeed
taken to be the case we can see that
4We follow the mathematical convention of defining the argument of the function as the
variables of the function rather than its parameters, which we could disregard at the cost of
complicating the notation
5Suppose we take returns to be time-independent so that R(q)=
pi(q)
c(q)
=
p(q)q−c(q)
c(q)
then we
can say that pi(q) = R(q)c(q), so
∂pi(q)
∂c(q)
= R(q)maxq∈QR(q) = maxq∈Q
∂pi(q)
∂c(q)
6We emphasise again it is alone in the variable space Q of the firm, not in its parameter
space. Output of other firms at various times may well enter the expression, but they, from
the firm’s perspective, are not variables it can control and are therefore for all intents and
purposes parameters.
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∂∂qt′
[
p (qt) qt − c (qt)
c (qt)
]
= 0 (4)
hence
∂
∂qt
R (q) = 0 ∀ t ∈ [0, T ] ∂
∂qt
[
p (qt) qt − c (qt)
c (qt)
]
= 0∀ t ∈ [0, T ] (5)
Hence, the firm effectively solves a symmetric problem for each and every
time period t ∈ [0, T ] and so we can, without loss of generality reduce equation
1 to a non-time-dependent expression of the objective function
R (q) =
p (q) q − c (q)
c (q)
(6)
and our theory (equation 2) to
q∗ = argmaxq∈QR (q) (7)
q∗ = q :
d
dq
R (q) = 0 (8)
The theory that firms maximise their returns according to the first order
conditions 87, implies that
c (q)
[
q
d
dq
p (q) + p (q)− d
dq
c (q)
]
= [p (q) q − c (q)] d
dq
c (q) (9)
It is advantageous at this point to define average total costs as ATC (q) ≡
c(q)
q and marginal costs as MC (q) =
d
dq c (q), so that, dividing each side of 9 by
q we obtain
ATC (q)
[
d
d
dq
p (q) + p (q)−MC (q)
]
= [p (q)−ATC (q)]MC (q) (10)
which can be simplified to a condition which the choice of return-maximising
firms, q∗, must satisfy:
q∗ = q : ATC (q)
(
q
d
dq
p (q) + p (q)
)
= MC (q) p (q) (11)
We can take this to be the fundamental condition on the production plan q∗
of a return-maximising firm, in that the return maximising output of the firm
must satisfy this condition8. Note that if revenue is taken to be Rv = p (q) q,
then we can define marginal revenue to be MRv (q) ≡ q ddqp (q) + p (q), and so
11 becomes
7
d
dq
R (q) =
1
c (q)2
{
c (q)
[
q
d
dq
p (q) + p (q)− d
dq
c (q)
]
− [p (q) q − c (q)] d
dq
c (q)
}
= 0
8The first order necessary conditions imply the output choice is a maximum provided the
second order sufficient condition that the function be concave holds, which follows if as below
we assume the cost function is convex and the revenue function is weakly concave.
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q∗ = q : ATC (q)MRv (q) = MC (q) p (q) (12)
The great beauty of this equation is that it is highly general, and allows us
to vary the degree of competition and analyse the implications for the return-
maximising output simply by changing the first derivative of the demand func-
tion, reflecting inverse of the price elasticity of demand.
2.1 Production plans under special case of competitive
markets
Let us take a competitive market as a baseline scenario for the return maximi-
sation problem. In a competitive market firms are price takers as they face an
infinitely elastic demand curve, so ddpq (p)→∞, and it follows that, taking the
limit,
d
dq
p (q) = 0p (q) = p (13)
i.e. the price the firm receives for its output is independent of its output. If
this is indeed the case then applying 13 to the fundamental condition (equation
11) on the choice of a return-maximising firm we find that the production plan
under a competitive market, q∗c must satisfy a special case of 11 where
d
dqp (q) =
0:
q∗c = q : ATC (q) = MC (q) (14)
Hence the return-maximising firm in a competitive market seeks to produce
that amount which equates its average and marginal costs, regardless of the
price of their output, provided that that price is above costs9. This may seem a
rather unusual statement, though it makes sense when we consider that firms in
a competitive market have no control over their prices, while they do over their
costs, so it would make sense for them to focus on costs in their decision making
process unless prices are so low as to make their activities unprofitable. In fact,
it is fairly straightforward to demonstrate a very intuitive result following from
14 (a special case of the fundamental condition 11) that in competitive markets,
firms which have no control over the price of their output seek to minimise
average total costs in order to maximise return.
This proposition is in fact the corollary of a well-known result (which will
be proved here for the sake of rigour), that under certain conditions on the cost
function, average total costs are minimised when average total cost is equal to
marginal cost.
Proposition 1 If d
2
dq2 c (q) > 0 ∀ q ∈ Q (that is, the cost function is globally
convex), and the cost function is second-order but not third order differentiable
then
q∗c = q : ATC (q) = MC (q) q
∗
c = argminq∈QATC (q)
9It may seem trivial, but if p (q) > ATC (q) then p (q) q−c (q) < 0, and return maximisation
would imply that q∗ = 0 as any production will lead to a loss
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The first order necessary conditions for a minimisation problem require that
d
dq
ATC (q) =
c (q)
q
= 0
hence the first order necessary condition for the average total cost minimi-
sation are
q ddq c (q)− c (q)
q2
= 0ATC (q) = MC (q)
Now, for a second-order but not third order differentiable average total cost
function, the Taylor expansion about q is (for some constant κ)
ATC (q′) = ATC (q) + (q′ − q) d
dq
ATC (q) + (q′ − q)2 1
2
d2
dq2
ATC (κ)
the first order conditions imply that
ATC (q′) = ATC (q) + (q′ − q)2 1
2
d2
dq2
ATC (κ)
So we can say that q minimisesATC (q) if and only ifATC (q) < ATC (q′) ∀ q′ 6=
q, which would require that d
2
dq2ATC (κ) > 0 and the average cost function be
convex, which is indeed the case, by assumption on the total cost function.
Hence since q∗c must satisfy the first order necessary conditions, it is indeed a
minimiser of average total cost.
Given that the definition of q∗c follows from the special case 14 of the fun-
damental condition 11 on output choice within the theory return-maximisation,
we can state an immediate corollary of proposition 1.
Corollary 1 Under competitive markets, return maximisation in output choice
implies that firms seek to minimise costs10.
It an interesting though somewhat mathematically de jure requirement that
in a competitive market there be economies of scale for the average cost minimi-
sation problem to be non-trivial. Mathematically this is a trivial requirement,
for if there was no region where average total costs were decreasing, then aver-
age total costs in all regions must be increasing, and there would be no turning
point in Q ⊂ R++ where average costs are minimised at zero output. This is
the content of another proposition, stating that economies of scale must exist
for supply to be non-trivial.
Proposition 2 If supply is non-trivial then there must be a region where aver-
age total costs are non-increasing. That is, q∗c > 0∃ [q1 q2] ⊂ Q : ddqATC (q) ≤
0
Suppose that q∗c is indeed a minimiser of costs. Then the second order
sufficient conditions for the average total cost function imply that the first order
necessary conditions are satisfied at a turning point of costs, and in particular
10As will be discussed later (see p.15 below), this maximising condition implies that there
is in fact no supply curve at a firm level
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a nadir (minimum) of the average total cost function. Hence it must be the
case about q∗c that ATC (q
∗
c − ε) > ATC (q∗c ) for some range of ε > 0. Let
us suppose, by way of contradiction, that @ [q1 q2] ⊂ Q : ddqATC (q) ≤ 0.
This then implies that average total costs must be everywhere increasing in
q, that is, ddqATC (q) > 0 ∀ q ∈ Q. But if this then were the case, we would
have ATC (q∗c − ε) < ATC (q∗c ), which contradicts that q∗c > 0 is a minimiser of
average total costs, because only for q∗c = 0 is ATC (q
∗
c − ε) ≮ ATC (q∗c ), and
even then this is only true trivially as −ε /∈ Q. Hence it must be the case that
for a non-trivial minimiser to exist there must be some region of Q for which
average total costs are decreasing (strictly speaking, non-increasing).
Hence, for a positive supply to be consistent with return-maximisation un-
der perfect competition, there must exist economies of scale. Obviously in an
economic sense as opposed to a mathematical one, this requirement is highly
important and interesting. Indeed it is crucial, for it implies if there is no region
where marginal cost is non-increasing, there will be no point other than zero
output at which costs are minimised, and thus in a perfectly competitive mar-
ket return-seeking firms will produce nothing. Economies of scale then are vital
(quite literally, were the output food) for without them there would be no supply
in a perfectly competitive market according to the logic of return-maximising
firms11.
It should be clear then that under competitive markets, return maximising
firms seek to minimise their costs given that they have no control over their
prices. This is an interesting result as it differs in its conditions on choice from
the standard models of profit maximisation under competitive markets, which
state that firms will choose to maximise profits by producing to a level where
their marginal costs are equal to the market price of their output (marginal
revenue). Under that model prices and marginal costs will fall to average total
costs only under specific conditions, which are taken generally to hold in the
“long term”, when competitive forces and free entry lead profit maximising firms
to minimise costs. Here, firms attempt to minimise costs in the first instance,
maximising their return. Like the standard profit maximisation models, we
would expect competitive pressures over time to shift the demand for the firm’s
output toward the minimum of average total costs, but we would have to make
additional assumptions within this model for that to be the case of necessity.
Indeed, given that firms have no control over their prices in the logic of this-
as in the profit maximisation-model it is entirely possible in the first instance
that prices are a mark-up over marginal costs (and average total costs), since
firms focus on minimising costs only in striving for maximum returns rather
than equating prices to marginal costs in striving for maximum profit. Indeed,
in a competitive market with return seeking firms, we must say in the first
instance that p = MC (q∗c ) if and only if the demand curve for the firm’s output
satisfies that exact property. That is12, if q = q∗c then p = MC (q
∗
c ) if and only if
consumers are willing to pay a price equal to the marginal cost of that product,
11This might seem utterly absurd and contradictory, given that the firm would make zero
return producing nothing. We suggest that the problem lies not in the logic of return max-
imisation but rather in the fact that perfect competition is in fact an impossible scenario, and
hence absurd to assume as anything other than a limiting case. Taking this view, these results
seem not so contradictory given they occur within an absurd scenario.
12Given that all these variables are defined over the set of real numbers R which is continuous
and non-reflexive for any two distinct elements of the set
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or p (q∗c ) = MC (q
∗
c ). This is equivalent to assuming that there is perfectly free
entry of exactly symmetric infinitesmal firms. Hence we require additional, and
rather strong assumptions on demand to eliminate the possibility of mark-ups in
competitive markets with return-seeking firms. Over time, we may expect entry
of other return-seeking firms if this were not the case, but in the first instance
we cannot in a competitive market guarantee that prices equal marginal costs,
and in general must say that even in such a market prices are a mark-up over
marginal costs.
It may seem that this is a failing of the model. We disagree, and argue
that it is actually a strength, given the universally acknowledged ubiquity of
mark-ups of prices over costs across a variety of market structures. The model
actually even under the strong assumption of perfect competition manages to
reflect the reality of pricing strategies.
2.2 Production plans in the general case
In general, we can take firm-specific demand to be a non-specified function of
the firm’s output, p (q). In this case, the firm’s production plans must satisfy
the general condition implied by return maximisation (equation 11)
q∗ = q : ATC (q)
(
q
d
dq
p (q) + p (q)
)
= MC (q) p (q) (15)
Immediately we can see that in general, when demand is not infinitely elas-
tic, costs are no longer minimised. Simply observe that equation 12, following
directly from this condition, implies
ATC (q)
MRv (q)
p (q)
= MC (q) (16)
and hence provided that MRv(q)p(q) 6= 1 (this occurs when demand is not in-
finitely elastic and the market is imperfectly competitive), marginal costs are
not equated to average total costs when returns are maximised. This is quite
simply because when the firm does not face an infinitely elastic demand curve,
it is not a price taker and can affect the price of its output in the market. It thus
must take prices and their determination into account in its production plans. It
is quite elementary to demonstrate that average costs are higher than marginal
costs, and the immediate corollary, applying Proposition 1 is that costs are no
longer minimised under return-maximising firms.
Proposition 3 The production plan of a return maximising firm for a normal
good is in general such that average total costs are higher than marginal costs.
That is, for q∗ satisfying 11, and for ddqp (q) ≤ 0
ATC (q∗) ≥MC (q∗)
This proposition immediately follows from the definition of q∗ as satisfying
condition 11, which may be rewritten as(
q∗ ddqp (q
∗) + p (q∗)
)
p (q∗)
=
MC (q∗)
ATC (q∗)
9
Now, if the output is a normal good the demand curve has a negative slope,
so we have
d
dq
p (q∗) ≤ 0
(
q∗ ddqp (q
∗) + p (q∗)
)
p (q∗)
≤ 1 MC (q
∗)
ATC (q∗)
≤ 1
And thus it must be the case for 11 to hold that ATC (q∗) ≥MC (q∗)
This makes sense when we consider that in any deviation from the compet-
itive market production plan q∗c , costs will no longer be minimised because q
∗
must satisfy a condition which no longer guarantees the equality of marginal
and average total costs. Intuitively, this non-minimisation of costs is because
the firm can in general affect the price of its output, and can increase returns
either by increasing price or decreasing costs. Indeed, we can and will show now
that the return maximising firm will set the price of its output as a mark-up
over its costs.
Proposition 4 Any non-trivial13 production plan of a return maximising firm
for a normal good is in general such that prices are a mark-up over its marginal
costs. That is, for q∗ 6= 0 satisfying 11, and for ddqp (q) ≤ 0
p (q∗) ≥MC (q∗)
The same conditions here are assumed as for Proposition 3, and so it must be
the case that ATC (q∗) ≥MC (q∗). Now if we can show that ATC (q∗) ≤ p (q∗),
then by the transitivity of the real numbers R upon which all these variables
are defined, we will have the result.
Now, that ATC (q∗) ≤ p (q∗) is in fact implied by the definition of q∗ in the
theory of maximum returns (equation 7), which states that
q∗ = argmaxq∈QR (q) = argmaxq∈Q
{
p (q) q − c (q)
c (q)
}
To see this, suppose by way of contradiction that ATC (q∗) > p (q∗) and
q∗ 6= 0. Then p (q∗) q∗ < c (q∗) and R (q∗) < 0 ∀ q ∈ Q\{0}. But this contradicts
q∗ being a maximiser of returns, since R (0) = 0 > R(q∗). Hence in all but non-
trivial production plans, we must have ATC (q∗) ≤ p (q∗), while we have from
above proposition 9 that ATC (q∗) ≥MC (q∗), so by the transitivity of the real
numbers R we can state that
p (q∗) ≥ ATC (q∗) ≥MC (q∗) p (q∗) ≥MC (q∗)
Hence when we are in the general case where markets can be competitive or
non-competitive in any manner14, return-seeking firms will supply output such
that prices are a mark-up over costs, both marginal and (as was demonstrated
in the proposition) average. This is because whereas in the competitive market
case, they seek only to minimise costs and have no control over prices, in a non-
competitive market they will have control over prices, and can increase their
13i.e. any production plan which involves some form of actual production rather than the
trivial no-production production plan q∗ = 0
14p (q) can be taken as a monopolists demand curve, or if we were to take other firms’
quantities as parameters it could be the demand curve for a Cournot oligopolist
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returns by manipulating prices to be higher and costs lower. We can see quite
easily that they do this by restricting supply, producing less than they would in
a competitive market, as we would expect a non-competitive firm to act.
Proposition 5 For a return-maximising firm producing a normal good, the
production plan for a non-competitive firm entails restricting supply relative to
the competitive supply. That is, for q∗ 6= 0 satisfying 11, and for ddqp (q) ≤ 0
q∗c ≥ q∗
From Proposition 1, we have that q∗c = argminq∈Qc (q) since ATC (q
∗
c ) =
MC (q∗c ). But in general q
∗ does not satisfy this, by the fundamental condition
on the choice of a return-maximising firm (equation 11), and hence ATC (q∗) ≥
ATC (q∗c ).
Suppose by way of contradiction then that q∗ > q∗c . Then as above we have
ATC (q∗) 6= minq∈QATC (q). However, in almost all cases q is a normal good,
so ddqp (q) ≤ 0, so p (q∗) < p (q∗c ). Hence q∗ > q∗c contradicts the definition of
q∗ = argmaxq∈QR (q), since prices can be increased and costs decreased, and
return thus increased by changing production plans from q∗ to q∗c . Hence it
must be the case that q∗ ≤ q∗c .
These results are on the face of it much in agreement with the results of the
standard profit maximising theory of firms. Indeed, as in such models we have
firms restricting output in a bid to push prices upward and obtain economic
rents15. However, this model shows us also how the decisions processes of firms
vary with the degree of market competitiveness. We have noted this already
(see p.6 above), but to be more specific, notice that the fundamental condition
q∗ = q : ATC (q)
(
q
d
dq
p (q) + p (q)
)
= MC (q) p (q)
varies with the degree of competition as the slope of the demand curve
changes, and hence the relative importance of the different variables in the
decision process also changes. In general firms which maximise returns according
to this condition must consider both prices and costs. But as the market becomes
more competitive the demand curve becomes more price elastic, and ddqp (q)
tends to zero, implying price-setting matters less in the firm’s decision process
relative to cost minimisation. As markets become more and more competitive
then, return-maximising firms respond less to demand when making decisions,
in the limit of perfect competition effectively merely checking to see prices are
above or below average total costs.
3 Output choices in discrete alternatives space
and the supply curve
We have now studied ad nauseam the properties of q∗ as defined by the condi-
tions above, but before we apply the theory of return-maximising firms to the
15If the firm obtains rents, then it has value. Rents arise from the non-equality of prices
with costs, and so if prices equal costs the firm has no rents and therefore no value.
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choice of inputs to support output of q∗ we will acknowledge and try to incorpo-
rate into our theory that in reality it is exceedingly rare for the production space
Q to be continuous16. In general production is limited to discrete quantities as
goods and services tend to be objects which can be only supplied in multiples
of some minimal unit. We can only buy multiples of q many units of a good in
general, be that constraint imposed “artificially” by the firm, through market
institutions or physical limits. There exists, in a sense a “quanta”, or minimum
unit of production.
To that purpose, we define Q∆ ⊂ Q to be a discrete grid17 contained within
the production space Q where production plans are defined, such that we can
say Q is dense in Q∆ and that Q∆ “quantises” the output space Q. It seems
fairly reasonable to us that maximal elements may exist between two discrete
units (i.e. a q∗ ∈ Q\Q∆), so that, technically speaking, the firm would maximise
revenue at a point in Q but not in Q∆. The firm may indeed know that this
is the case, and that the constraint imposed by the discrete nature of Q∆ ⊂ Q
makes such a production plan impossible. It is for this reason that we say our
theory is one of return-”seeking”, rather than return-maximising firms. In such
cases, we say that the firm’s production plan becomes q∗∆ ∈ Q∆ such that the
distance between q∗∆ and q
∗ is minimised,
q∗∆ = argminq∆∈Q∆ {λ = |q∆ − q∗|} (17)
In fact, this can be a general specification for the choice of a firm, since if
q∗ ∈ Q∆ then minq∆∈Q∆λ = 0 and q∗∆ = q∗. This may seem a rather arbitrary
specification, though it merely specifies that while firms may know that their
maximal production plan is q∗, if they cannot produce at this level due to the
constraint imposed by the discrete production requirement, they will produce
as close to that point as possible. There are nonetheless two drawbacks to
such a specification, the first being that in the case where q∗ is equidistant
from two points in Q∆, the set of q∆ which satisfies this condition is not a
singleton, though we would tentatively suggest that such a case is rather rare.
A second drawback is that equation 17 is only consistent with the theory of
return maximisation provided that q∗∆ = argmaxq∆∈Q∆R (q). We can show
that this is only the case when the returns function is symmetric about the
maximal point q∗.
Proposition 6 q∗∆ = argmaxq∆∈Q∆R (q) for any quantisation of Q if and only
if R (q) is symmetric about q∗ (that is, R (q∗ + ε) = R (q∗ − ε) ∀ ε ∈ R).
Notice that argmaxq∆∈Q∆R (q) = argminq∆∈Q∆R (q∆) − R (q∗), since by
definition q∗ = argmaxq∈QR (q), that is to say, the q∆ which maximises returns
will be the same q∆ which minimises the difference between the return yielded
by it and the maximal return overall. Now, argminq∆∈Q∆R (q∆) − R (q∗) =
argminq∆∈Q∆ |q∆ − q∗| for any quantisation of Q if and only if R (q) is sym-
metric about q∗ because if this is indeed the case, then the only criterion de-
termining whether q∆ = q
∗ is a maximal element is its distance from q∗ since
16If Q ⊂ R were convex then for any two q, q′ ∈ Q we would have q′′ = αq + (1− α) q′′ ∈
Q∀α ∈ [0, 1] and Q would be an interval contained in R
17∆=delta, d for delta, d for discrete. A grid such as Q∆ could be taken to be, inter alia,
the set of natural numbers Z ⊂ R, in which the real numbers R are dense
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symmetry implies that R (q) is decreasing in an equivalent manner in both di-
rections around q∗.
A more consistent theory of q∗∆ would be to assume outright that it is selected
to minimise the difference between the return it yields, R (q∗∆), and R (q
∗).
However an important implication of the theory that is clearer to see as it
stands is that when we have a discrete output space, quantum jumps in demand
of certain magnitudes are required for output of the firms to increase, and hence
there is a range of demand curves p (q) for which supply q∗∆ remains unchanged,
and hence there is excess demand or supply, and the market does not “clear” in
the traditional sense.
To see this, take a production plan q∗ which satisfies 11, and which thus
depends on demand p (q). Suppose then that there is an increase in autonomous
(i.e. non-price dependent) demand for every output q, denoted ∂p (q) = p′ (q)−
p (q) > 0 ∀ q ∈ Q,18. When this happens, 11 will no longer hold with equality
at q∗, and in particular, proposition 3, and a non-competitive market (where
demand is not infinitely elastic) implies that
ATC (q∗)
(
q∗
d
dq
p′ (q∗) + p′ (q∗)
)
> MC (q∗) p′ (q∗) (18)
provided that the increase in demand is uniform across Q (i.e. we have a
simple shift of intercept) or, failing this, that the change in the slope of the
demand curve is negligible, so that ddqp
′ (q) remains effectively constant or at
least sufficiently small. Restoring the equality of 11 to maximise returns with
the new demand curve then requires a decrease in costs through an increase in
output, which we can see by the fact that the re-written inequality(
q∗ ddqp
′ (q∗) + p′ (q∗)
)
p′ (q∗)
>
MC (q∗)
ATC (q∗)
(19)
must be restored to equality through a change of the return maximising
output q∗. The right hand side must increase via an increase in the maxi-
mal production plan, denoted ∂q∗ > 0, which is implied by Proposition 1 and
Proposition 5 (provided that the cost function has a uniform first derivative
throughout the half-space of Q to the right of q∗), while the left hand side must
decrease via the same increase in q∗ (implied by negatively sloped demand when
the second derivative of demand is small) until equality is restored.
This implies that the return-maximising output increases with increases in
demand, and in some sense supply curves slope “up” . However, in another
sense, supply curves can be of any shape, because additional assumptions on
the exact shape of the cost curves and demand curve will be required for the
increase in return-maximising output to not lead to a decrease in price below
its previous level. Hence, while return-maximising output will increase (under
certain conditions), in response to an increase in demand, the increase in demand
may nonetheless not necessarily lead to an increase in prices.
Moreover, the discrete nature of output space Q∆ means that it is not nec-
essarily the case that what is actually supplied, q∗∆, as defined by 17 above
will respond to an increase in demand, even if q∗ does. If there is an increase
18The reverse argument will hold for a decrease in demand at every output, ∂p (q) = p′ (q)−
p (q) < 0∀ q ∈ Q
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in demand, then there are three possible cases for the response of supply in a
discrete output space to demand.
Suppose that initially the maximal production plan lay within a closed inter-
val encompassed by two adjacent points in the gridQ∆, that is, q
∗ ∈ [q1∆ q2∆] ⊂
Q, then
1. If q∗∆ ≤ q∗ (q∗∆ = q1∆) prior to the change in demand then the required
change in demand for an increase in maximal output q∗ for supply to
change at least to the next point in the grid Q∆ ⊂ Q, and hence ∂q∗∆ > 0,
according to the definition of q∗∆ is
19
∂p (q) : (q∗ + ∂q∗) ≥ q
1
∆ + q
2
∆
2
(20)
intuitively, if there were under-production relative to the return-maximising
amount, then the quantum shift in demand must push the return-maximising
production plan in Q at least past the halfway point between the two ad-
jacent points in Q∆ for quantity supplied by the firm to increase.
2. If q∗∆ ≥ q∗ (q∗∆ = q2∆) prior to the change in demand then the required
change in demand for an increase in maximal production q∗ for supply to
change at least to the next point in the grid Q∆ ⊂ Q, and hence ∂q∗∆ > 0
according to the definition of q∗∆ is
∂p (q) : (q∗ + ∂q∗) ≥ q
3
∆ + q
2
∆
2
(21)
where q3∆ is the grid point right-adjacent to q
2
∆ and defining the end-
point of the closed interval
[
q2∆ q
3
∆
]
. Obviously, this is a more difficult
requirement for an increase in demand to fulfil, as it requires the return-
maximising production to increase beyond the quantity currently supplied
and the midpoint on the next interval, in that it requires a larger increase
in demand ceteris paribus.
3. If neither of the preceding conditions are met, then ∂q∗∆ = 0. This occurs
if the shift in demand is not quantum, and does not cause the new return-
maximising production plan q∗ to exceed at least one critical point for
supply to switch from one point in the output grid Q∆ ⊂ Q to an adjacent
one.
These conditions taken together specify the dynamics of supply in response to a
change in demand in a market with return-maximising firms, where for whatever
reason (physical or institutional) only discrete outputs are permitted. We know
from above (see p.13) that supply curves will in some sense slope upward under
return-maximisation (i.e. with the demand curve, though not necessarily in
price), but they will be a discrete and stepwise collection of points q∗∆ (p) rather
than a continuous curve q∗ (p). We will require quantum increases in demand
(which is to say, an increase in demand of at least some minimal amount) for
supply to respond given the constraint imposed by the discrete output space,
19The proof of these conditions is quite intuitive, and follows directly from the definition
of q∗∆ = argminq∆∈Q∆ {λ = |q∆ − q∗|}. Were this indeed the case, the point at which q∗∆
switches between two adjacent points on the grid Q∆ is the midpoint between them.
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and hence it is not necessarily the case that supply maximises returns in a
“global” sense. While markets will tend toward a maximising of returns (and
presumably the desires of consumers) we cannot say that they in a traditional
sense “clear”. It is possible for there to be an under-supply (q∗ > q∗∆) when
consumers would desire output which is not possible for the firm, but for which
an over-supply (q∗ < q∗∆) on the part of the firm is not quite justified.
Again, some may see this as a failing of our theory. We disagree, and sug-
gest that the quantisation of output space allows us to understand better part
of the reason why inventories actually exist in reality, and why they can often
run “short” relative to consumer demand. If only discrete outputs are possible,
then part of the reason inventories exist and why they might suffer a shortfall
is exactly that only discrete outputs are possible for whatever physical or insti-
tutional reason, while the “market clearing” output (where there would be no
inventories, under-supply or over-supply) would actually lie .
Let us here introduce something of a piece de resistance of counter-intuitive
results regarding the supply of output under the theory of return-maximising
firms. Implicit in the foregoing discussion of the response of supply to demand
was the assumption that markets are somewhat non-competitive, so that the
firms demand curve is not infinitely elastic, such that ddqp (q) = 0, so that
q∗ was determined by the general condition on return maximising production
plans (equation 11). However, if we are in a competitive market, the return-
maximising condition is no longer 11 but the special case (equation 14), where
d
dqp (q) = 0,
q∗c = q : ATC (q) = MC (q)
But here demand, p (q) does not enter the consideration of the firm in setting
its return maximising output, and hence changes in prices have no effect on
changes in output, even without the output space being discrete, such that
quantum jumps in demand are required. The response of supply to demand
utterly is non-existent and supply curves are vertical at the cost-minimising
output.
This rather counter-intuitive result stems from the fact in a competitive
market each individual return-seeking firm is merely concerned with minimising
costs (Proposition 1), as it has no control over the price level. So a priori, or in
the short term without the assumption that there will be entry upon observance
of positive returns, we cannot say that supply will respond to demand in a
competitive market with return seeking firms. An increase in demand in a
competitive market justifies not an increase in supply, because an increase in
supply would increase what were hitherto minimised costs, and cut away at the
increased returns yielded by an increased price.
Hence a competitive market with return-seeking firms will not clear in a
traditional sense, even if the output space were not quantised. Without the
assumption that entry occurs rather unusually rapidly up to the point where firm
demand has fallen to average total costs, there will be “cash left on the table”
insofar as increases in demand go unmet. In a sense then, while monopolistic
markets are somewhat inefficient in that prices do not reflect accurately the
cost of the output produced, insofar as supply response to changing demand
is concerned they are more efficient than competitive markets. Under certain
conditions, increased demand will be met with increased output, whereas we
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cannot, without additional and rather strong assumptions on entry, say the
same for competitive markets.
4 Choices of inputs when capital inputs are quan-
tum
A firm’s production plan is not characterised alone by a decree that a certain
output q∗∆ be called into existence, the plan must also specify the inputs x ∈ X ⊂
R|X|+ which are required for that output to be produced. The relation between
the two is given by the production function q : X → Q, or q = q (x). Let us, as is
common, restrict the cardinality of the input space to two, |X| = 2 and propose
that there are two inputs into production, capital k ∈ K and labour l ∈ L, so
that q = q (l k). It is relatively standard to assume that there are diminishing
but positive marginal products, ∂∂·q (·) ≥ 0, ∂
2
∂·2 q (·) ≤ 0, and we will also assume
that the cross-derivative of the marginal product of both labour and capital are
positive, ∂
2
∂l∂k q (l k) ,
∂2
∂k∂lq (l k) ≥ 0, so that increased use of capital makes
labour more productive and vice versa, reflecting complementarity of inputs in
production.
The logic of return maximisation would suggest that the selection of inputs
to produce output q∗∆ is guided by the striving to minimise the cost c (q
∗
∆) of
that output in the choice of inputs. Now, if we take w ∈ R to be the cost of
labour, and r ∈ R to be the cost of capital in competitive input markets we can
express the cost of producing q∗∆ as
c (q∗∆) = wl + rk (22)
and so the theory of return maximisation would dictate that 22 be minimised
subject to the constraint imposed by the production function q (l k). Hence
our theory of input selection under return maximisation is much the same as
that under profit maximisation
{l k}∗ = argmin{l,k}∈{[l,k]:q∗∆=q(l,k)}c (q
∗
∆) (23)
This is a simple minimisation problem which can be solved by the application
of Lagrangian optimisation20 to give the first order necessary conditions
k∗ = k :
∂
∂l
q (l k) =
w
Λ
(24)
l∗ = l :
∂
∂k
q (l k) =
r
Λ
(25)
eliminating the shadow price Λ of output21 we obtain the condition which
must be satisfied by input choices for costs to be minimised
{l k}∗ : ∆l
∆k
=
[
∂q(l k)
∂k
]
[
∂q(l k)
∂l
] = w
r
(26)
20The Lagrangian, modified objective function, is here L = wl + rk − Λ (q (l k)− q∗∆)
21Which allows us to interpret these conditions as setting marginal products to shadow real
prices of inputs
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this condition implicitly defines the choice of inputs l and k as those which
tangent the slopes of the isoquant q∗∆ = q (l, k) and iso-cost c (q
∗
∆) = wl + rk.
This is a familiar and standard result of cost minimisation exercises under profit
maximisation problems, where inputs are selected so that the marginal rate of
technical substitution between inputs is equal to their relative costs.
Now let us consider the dynamics of a quantum increase in demand which
causes an increase of supply in the quantised output space22, that is, ∂p (q) ∀ q :
∂q∗∆ > 0. Now, the return-seeking firm must produce this new level of ouptut,
and so it is the case that the constraint in the cost minimisation problem must
still hold, that is
q∗∆ = q (l k) (27)
but for 27 to hold, given that ∂q∗∆ > 0, we must have an increase in the
inputs into production, that is, either ∂k∗ ≥ 0 or ∂l∗ ≥ 0 or both. However,
it is typically the case that, like output, capital is quantised so that there is a
minimum amount of capital that must be employed, for either institutional or
physical reasons. If the capital in question were a machine, then increasing the
stock involved in production by half a machine is unlikely to have an affect on
output, as half a machine is useless. Thus, we think it reasonable to suppose
that the space of capital inputs K is, like production, dense in a grid K∆ ⊂ K
of discrete capital inputs, each point in K∆ representing a multiple of one unit
of capital. Hence, like with output, though k∗ minimises costs, it might be the
case that k∗ /∈ K∆ and therefore this level of input is technically impossible,
and we can specify as with output that the selected capital input in K∆ is
k∆ = argmink∆∈K∆ {λ = |k∆ − k∗|}. Obviously, 27 must still hold and so this
is only possible by selecting whatever labour input makes it so.
Let us suppose, for the sake of illustrating the dynamics of quantised capital
inputs, that initially (i.e. before the increase in demand), k∗ ∈ K∆, and so
k∗∆ = k
∗. Now, if there is an increase in demand such that there is a quantum
increase in the supply that the firm selects, ∂q∗∆ > 0 but this for reasons specified
below does not induce the firm to move from k∗∆ to the next adjacent capital
input in the grid input space K∆, then in order to produce this and for 27 to
hold, labour input must increase to make it so, that is, ∂l > 0.
However, if labour inputs are increased, then given the diminishing marginal
product of labour, ∂
2
∂l2 q (l k) ≤ 0, we have that ∂∂lq (l k) will decrease, while
the complementarity of labour and capital, ∂
2
∂k∂lq (l k) ≥ 0 implies that the
marginal product of capital ∂∂k q (l k) will increase. Together these imply that[
∂q(l k)
∂k
]
[
∂q(l k)
∂l
] ≥ w
r
(28)
that is, the cost minimisation condition 26 no longer holds (in non-trivial
cases) and costs c (q∗∆) are no longer minimised for the new quantised output.
Hence the quantisation of capital inputs, which is imposed physically or institu-
tionally in much the same manner as for output means that in general, a decision
for the firm to increase output leads to a non-minimisation of costs as the exact
additional capital required will be invested only in specific cases. Indeed, we
22Again, a similar argument would apply in reverse for a decrease in demand
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can only say that capital inputs will increase at all if the cost of producing an
increased level of output with the same level of capital stock, ck∆ (q
∗
∆) is greater
than the cost of that output with an increased capital stock k′∆ in the half-space
of K∆ to the right of k∆, ck′∆ (q
∗
∆)
∂k∗∆ > 0 ⇐⇒ ∂q∗∆ : ck∆ (q∗∆) > ck′∆ (q∗∆) (29)
If this is indeed the case, then a quantum increase in supply responding to a
quantum increase in demand will lead to an incremental increase in capital from
its previous level in the grid of capital inputs K∆ to at least the right-adjacent
point. Thus we can say that when firms seek to minimise costs23 for any given
output level q, when capital24 is quantised so that only discrete increases are
technically possible, they will not be able to minimise costs in general, and
capital inputs increase in increments with quantum increases in decided output.
Nonetheless, we can see that since k∗∆ is selected so as to minimise costs
for a given return maximising (in Q∆) level of output q
∗
∆, the criterion guiding
capital investment is equivalent to maximising net present value. Investment
in an incremental unit of capital is only undertaken if not investing in that
unit of capital were to be sub-optimal in providing inputs for producing the
return-maximising level of output. Hence, capital investment seeks to max-
imise returns, by minimising the cost of producing a return-maximising level
of output. It is the case then that the input selection theory of our model of
return-seeking firms implies that choices concerning capital investment conform
to the net present value, or internal rate of return methods typically employed
in investment analysis.
5 Discussion
It is at this stage advantageous to elaborate in an informal manner some of the
finer points of our theory of return-seeking firms with the aid of Figure 1.
Panel (a) of Figure 1 illustrates optimal firm output q∗ consistent with
Proposition 1 in the special case of “competitive” price-taking. Three points are
of note. First, return maximisation corresponds with cost minimisation as per
Corollary 2, implying that firm output will be unresponsive to any shift in the
demand curve. Second, without additional assumptions on the position of the
firm’s demand curve, there is no implication that firm output is socially optimal
viz. prices accurately reflecting production costs. Third, a return-seeking firm
has at most the same output (likely less) than an analogous profit-maximising
firm in all cases, and hence we can also intuit that it will underutilise capital in
comparison.
The general case of the model is illustrated in Panel (b). Not only do we
observe that ATC(q) is above MC(q) at the optimal firm output as per Propo-
sition 4 and Proposition 6, we can see graphically the corollary that ATC(q)
must always be non-increasing up to, and including, the limiting case of a com-
petitive price-taking firm. A broad emprical literature on firm cost structures is
23In general, these results hold for any number of output decision rules, not merely return
maximisation or profit maximisation. Indeed, these results would hold for a random increase
in quantity supplied in response to an increase in demand.
24Or indeed, any other input into production
18
q* qp
Q
P
HaL
ATCHqL
MCHqL
pHqL
q* qp
Q
p*
pp
P
HbL
ATCHqL
MCHqL
pHqL
qm* qc*
Q
pmpc
P
HcL
ATCHqL
MCHqL
pHqLm
pHqLc
qm* qc*
Q
pm
pc
P
HdL
ATCHqL
pHqL pHqLD
s
Figure 1: Various market structures with return-seeking firms
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highly supportive of this model prediction (Walters, 1963; Blinder, Canetti and
Lebow, 1998).
Panel (c) allows us to observe the relationship noted above between the
slope of firm demand and its relative focus on cost minimisation compared
to price setting. Compared to the cost-minimising amount we see the firm
restricting output in response to its degree of price-setting power. As price-
setting power decreases (as demand flattens from p(q)m to p(q)c), the markup
over costs decreases ceteris paribus while the firm shifts its focus from restricting
output and increasing prices to minimising costs. Such a prediction is in keeping
with a body of evidence showing that firms set prices by marking-up costs, and
that the size of this mark-up is a function of their pricing power (Kalecki,
1952; Sraffa, 1926). As noted above, this is a particular beauty of the model
in that we can analyse the dynamics of output choice of return-maximising
firms as a response to increase competition. We take competition to manifest
as a flattening of the firm demand curve due to the supply of close substitute
goods, which we illustrate in Panel (c). Our model prediction on this point
is somewhat consistent with profit maximisation models whereby competition
reduce price and increases output. However, in our model competition is not
solely dependent on the number of firms in a market, rather it can equally rest
on consumer access to close substitute goods, regardless of the number of goods
or number of firms producing them.
Since the shape of the firm demand curve is a result of the competitiveness
of market, it takes little to derive that the model predicts return-maximising
firms may also engage in behaviours that reduce competitiveness to augment or
steepen their own demand curve. Common examples include product differen-
tiation, loyalty schemes, or other methods of capturing market share. Alterna-
tively, firms may lobby for patent protections or other regulatory barriers that
restrict production of substitutes.
In Section 2.3 it was shown that return-maximising output increases in re-
sponse to a positive shift in the demand curve (under certain fairly innocous
assumptions), as can be illustrated by way of the response of q∗ in Panel (d).
However in Panel (d) we may also observe that it is not necessarily the case
that an increase in demand will always result in an increase in price. Indeed,
under certain conditions on the relative slopes of the demand and cost curves,
demand increases may generate downward-sloping supply curves for an individ-
ual firm and for a market broadly defined. Such a result is expected from firms
facing relatively steep demand curves, but extensive economies of scale yet to
be utilised25. Thus supply can be broadly seen to respond positively to demand
increases under non-competitive conditions, but while in this sense the supply
curve slopes “up”, the supply curve (defined as the relationship between output
supplied and price) may actually be inverse.
We turn now to the impact of the quantised input and output space, graph-
ically representing our model of quantised output and input space in Figure
2.
The top panel represents the firm’s view of the market, while the bottom
panel characterises its input choice problem of cost minimisation given a certain
return-seeking output. We can project output choices in Panel (a) into the
representation of the cost function in Panel (b). In Panel (a) we observe the
25A result which is consistent with the findings of Shea (1993)
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result of quantising output space, where there exists a range a shifts in the
demand curve that do not generate change in firm output from one point to
another in the output grid. For an output change to occur we require a demand
curve shift of a magnitude so as to increase the return-maximising level of output
such that a quantum increase in the output supplied is justified. That is, the
shift in demand must cause return-maximising output to pass a critical mid-
point between to adjacent points in the output grid. This may seem like a
trivial matter in many markets, but for firms producing large discrete units of
goods, such as large scale manufacturing or construction, these considerations
are crucial determinants of whether they commit to their next project or not.
We can also observe that markets do not clear in the traditional sense, and
that the optimal level of output may lie between two points in the output grid.
Therefore, depending on the exact placement of the optimal output we may
have under or over supply relative to the “globally” optimal level, and hence
the possibility of inventories in an otherwise perfectly rational market.
In Panel (b) of Figure 2 we examine the impact on firm output choices
on choices of quantised capital input. The cost curves plotted here are level
curves for quantum levels of the capital input, hence corresponding to costs for
particular levels of the capital input in the quantised capital space. Projecting
down from Panel (a), the return maximising problem and the cost-minimisation
nested within it dictates which of these curves the firm finds itself on as an
outcome of its capital input selection in response to any shift demand. We can
observe that often a significant quantum increase in output is required to justify
on the basis of minimising costs for a particular production level a quantum shift
in choice of capital input.
Regarding the effect of interest rates on capital choice in the capital space,
we note here that the cost curve corresponding to each discrete capital choice
is a function of interest rates. Therefore, a change in interest rates may shift
the return-maximising capital choice to another discrete choice, which is con-
sistent with the long debated idea of capital re-switching were we to extend
the model to include an alternative capital input with a differential market and
price (Samuelson, 1966). We could also see at the market or economy-wide level
that at the margin of firm’s decision problems we may find a confluence of cap-
ital investment decisions, leading to cascades of capital investment as improved
prospects for returns (through increased demand) justify quantum increases in
capital investment. Hence the quantised nature of capital input spaces could go
some way to explaining business cycles through surges in investment as critical
points in capital input spaces are reached.
6 Conclusions
In this paper we have built a theory of firm behaviour methodologically consis-
tent with conventional methods in economics on the empirically and theoreti-
cally solid assumption that firms maximise returns rather than profits. While
this assumption alters ever so slightly the objective function of the theory (lit-
erally dividing profits by costs), the implications flowing from this theory are
radically different to those of the implications of the profit maximising theory.
Particularly in the limiting case of perfect competition, we no longer have a sup-
ply curve in any meaningful sense unless rather strong additional assumptions
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on entry are made, and we no longer can eliminate the possibility of mark-ups
over marginal costs, and economies of scale become a necessary condition for a
market to even exist. While firms in an imperfectly competitive market price
above marginal cost and thus are pricing inefficiently by restricting supply rela-
tive to its competitive level, they at least respond to demand to satiate it (under
certain conditions), and in this sense imperfectly competitive markets become
a more efficient market structure than perfectly competitive markets.
Notwithstanding this failure of markets to clear, we also made output and
capital input spaces discrete, reflecting the quantised nature of these variables
imposed physically or institutionally in reality, and showed that quantum jumps
in demand are required for supply, and for capital investment to respond, given
that they will only do so when firms are within imperfectly competitive mar-
kets. This means that markets do not clear in any traditional sense, since “the”
return-maximising level of output may lie within two technically possible quan-
tised outputs, and likewise for capital inputs. The quantum constraint on output
means that there can be under and over-supply, “cash left on the table” and
inventories even when firms are maximising returns. The similar constraint on
capital inputs allows us to understand under what conditions capital investment
will in fact respond to changes in output, and captures the “lumpy” nature of
capital, and why firms may not even be able to minimise costs in any global
sense for a given output.
While some might suggest that these negations of many results from profit-
maximising models are a weakness, we in fact regard them as a strength of
the model. They explain many aspects of markets that we observe in reality.
They explain why firms often seek to minimise average total costs regardless of
their pricing strategy (and why this is intuitively what a firm would do). We
can observe in the model how increasing competition leads firms to consider
controlling prices relatively less to minimising costs in their decision rules. We
also can see why markets will almost never clear, with inventories existing, and
running “short” due to over-supply and under-supply respectively, even when
firms and consumers are maximising. This model may negate many results of
profit maximisation that have over the years become canon and perhaps viewed
as indispensable, but in doing so it replaces these results with interesting new
ones and opens up new lines of theoretical and empirical investigation to flesh
out all the intricate subtleties of the return-seeking firm.
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